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NOTES
THE ABSCAM INVESTIGATION: USE AND ABUSE OF
ENTRAPMENT AND DUE PROCESS DEFENSES
From 1977 through 1980 the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted a notewor-
thy criminal investigation.' Although the original purpose of this operation was the
recovery of forged securities and stolen art work,' it quickly turned to the investigation of
political corruptions With the help of former FBI informant and life-long confidence
man Melvin Weinberg, 4 FBI agents devised an elaborate scheme designed to provide
opportunities for illegal conduct by public officials who were predisposed to political
corruption.' The scheme involved the creation of a fictitious corporation named "Abdul
Enterprises." 6 The corporation was purportedly headed by Sheik Yassir Habib of Abu
Dhabi, whose desire it was to invest in and immigrate to the United States.' The FBI
named this operation "ABSCAM" after the first two letters of "Abdul" and the word
"scam . "8
ABSCAM was designed to use private persons, unaware of the FBI agent's true
identities, to seek out public officials who would be willing to use their government.
influence on the sheik's behalf in return for money and other gilts." ABSCAM's first, and
most influential middleman was then-Mayor of Camden and New Jersey state senator
Angelo Errichetti who, along with Philadelphia attorney Howard Criden, expressed an
interest in using Arab money to promote and build an Atlantic City casino." During a
July, 1979 meeting on the sheik's Florida yacht, Errichetti agreed to use his political
resources to find public officials who would use their influence in exchange for monetary
rewards."
I United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1209-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), of 'd, 635 F.2d 932 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980). The program originated in the FBI's Hauppage, Long
Island office, under the supervision of agent John Good. Id.
• Id. at 1210.
3 Id.
• Weinberg agreed to cooperate with law enforcement officials after pleading guilty to fraud
charges in a Pennsylvania court. Id. at 1209.
5 United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
6 Id. Although credit for the idea is disputed, United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. at 1239,
Abdul Enterprises bore a striking resemblance to Weinberg's own highly successful and equally
fraudulent "London Investors, Ltd." Id. at 1209-10.
• United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. at 1210.
▪ Id.
• See id.
16 Id, at 1210.
" Id. Errichetti claimed that he possessed "extraordinary influence" with licensing commission-
ers, connections with organized crime, and "intimate knowledge of which members of the New
Jersey legislature could be bought." Id.
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By the end of 1979  Erricheni and Criden had produced almost a dozen elected
officials who met with FBI agents at locations monitored by hidden audio and video
equipment." At each of these meetings, cash payments ranging front ten to filly thou-
sand dollars were offered to these individuals," all but three of whom accepted. 14 In
addition, Errichetti int roduced the FB1 agents to several public officials who were offered
financial interests in Abdul projects, in return for political influence."
Event ually, information about the investigation began to leak to the press'" and,
consequently, it was terminated on February 2, 1980. 17 Within a year after ABSCAM
ended, grand juries were convened in three locations" and indictments were handed
clown involving twenty-six defendants." Despite both distinguishable fact patterns 2 " and
"r Id. These individuals included United States Representatives Michael 0. Myers and Raymond
Lederer of Pennsylvania, id. at 1212-13, Philadelphia City Councilmen Harry P. Jannotti and George
X, Schwartz, United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1196-97 (E.D. Pa. 1980), retid, 673 F.2d
578, 581 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982), and United States Senator Harrison A.
Williams, Jr. of New Jersey, United States v. Williams, 529 F. Stipp. 1085, 1090 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aft 'd,
705 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1983).
j3 While Harry Jannotti accepted only $10,000, United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Stipp. at 1184,
Michael Myers, Raymond Lederer, and Frank Thompson each accepted $50,000, United States v.
Myers, 527 F. Supp. at 1212-14.
United States v. Myers, 527 F. Stipp. at 1225. Those three individuals were Senator Larry.
Pressler of South Dakota, Congressman Edward Patten of New Jersey, and Congressman John P.
Murtha of Pennsylvania. Id.
" Id, at 1210.
" Id. at 1210-11.
'T Id. at 1211.
" The grand juries were convened in the Eastern District of New York, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia. Id. at 1211-12.
19 Id, The resulting cases were:
1. U.S. v. Alexander Andrew Alexandro, Jr. and Alfred Carpentier, , docket no. CR 80 -00102,
Eastern District of New York, tried before Hon. Mark A. Costantino in October, 1980.
2. U.S. v. Michael 0. Myers, Angelo J. Errichetti, Louis C. Johanson and Howard L. Criden,
docket no. CR 80-00249, Eastern District of New York, tried before Hon. George C.
Pratt in August, 1980.
3. U.S. v. Raymond F. Lederer, Angelo J. Errichetti, Louis C. Johanson and Howard L. Criden,
docket no. CR 80-00253, Eastern District of New York, tried before Hon. George C.
Pratt in January, 1981.
4. U.S. v. Frank Thotnpson, Jr., John M. Murphy, Howard L. Crider? and Joseph Silvestri,
docket no. CR 80-00291, Eastern District of New York, tried before Hon. George C.
Pratt in November, 1980.
5. U.S. V. Harry P. Jannotti, George X. Schwartz, Howard L. Criden and Louis C. Johanson,
docket no. CR 80-00166, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, tried before Hon. John P.
Fullam in September, 1980.
6. U.S. v. John W. Jenrette and John R. Stowe, docket no. CR 80-00289, District of
Columbia, tried before Hon. John G. Penn in September, 1980.
7. U.S. v. Richard Kelley, Eugene Robert Ciuzio and Stanley Weisz, docket no. CR 80
-00340,
District of Columbia, tried before Hon. William B. Bryant in December, 1980.
8. U.S. v. Harrison A. Williams, Jr., Alexander Feinberg, George Katz, and Angelo]. Errichetti,
docket no. CR 80-00575, Eastern District of New York, tried before Hon. George C.
Pratt in April, 1981.
9. U.S. v. Kenneth N. MacDonald and Angelo Errichetti, docket no. CR 81-00366. Indict-
ment returned June 18, 1981, Eastern District of New York, tried before Hon. George
C. Pratt in November, 1981.
10. U.S. v. Charles T. Walsh, Martin Gabey, Vincent]. Cuti, Jr., Nicholas Barbato, Angelo J.
Errichetti, and Bowe, Walsh & Associates, docket no, CR 81 -00218. Indictment returned
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varied legal strategies," each and every ABSCAM  defendant asserted either the defense
of entrapment or a violation of due process or both. None of these defenses proved
successful.
This note will demonstrate ABSCAM's inherent improprieties as they relate to the
defenses of entrapment and violation of due process. This note will also explore how
similar investigations in the future should be conducted so as to protect innocent individ-
uals from these improprieties. It is submitted that the convictions which resulted from the
ABSCAM investigation may have been due not only to the guilt of the defendants, but
also to the current state of the iaw of entrapment and due process and to he particular
structure of the ABSCAM investigation. Part 1 of this note will examine the entrapment
and due process defenses. First, it will discuss four United States Supreme Court cases
which have considered the entrapment defense. 22 The current "subjective- test for
emrapment will be described as well as an alternative "objective" test which has been
espoused by a minority of the Court." Then, Part 1 will discuss the defense of a due
process violation." Next, Part 11 of the note will examine the individual ABSCAM cases,
and the specific defenses which were alleged." Part III presents a discussion of the
problems inherent in the defenses of entrapment and due process as they relate to the
ABSCAM scenarios." It will be submitted that several factors, including the use of
videotape, unsuspecting middlemen, legal oilers mixed with illegal ones, and the lack of
prior reason to suspect the defendants, made the subjective view of entrapment ineffec-
tual as a defense for the crimes allegedly committed." Furthermore, it will be submitted
that a combination of the courts' refusal to adopt the objective view of entrapment and the
vague standards of the clue process defense gave ABSCAM defendants little chance of
constructing a successful defense despite their true innocence or guilt." Finally, Part IV
will discuss precautions which should be taken to prevent similar improprieties in future
investigations, and to insure that innocent individuals will not be entrapped by crimes
manufactured by the government."
I. BACKGROUND: ENTRAPMENT AND DUE PROCESS
Courts unifintuly have held that while the government and law enforcement agents
may use artifice and stratagem to apprehend criminals, they may not go so far as to induce
an innocent person to commit a crime." Entrapment exists when the government
supplies an otherwise innocent individual with the disposition to commit a crime." In
April 9, 1981; superseding indictment returned May 21, 1981, Eastern District of New
York, tried before Hon. George C. Pratt in September, 1981.
Id.
" See infra notes 99-120, 158-64, 176-82, 189-205, and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 121-57, 165-75, 183-88, 206.36, and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 44-62 and accompanying text.
23
 See infra notes 33-69 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 70-98 and accompanying text,
" See infra notes 100-236 and accompanying text.
26 See' infra notes 237-52, 298-318, and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 253-97 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 300-18 and accompanying text.
2a
	 infra notes 319-54 and accompanying (ext.
" Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441-42(1932).
" Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 371-72 (1958).
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addition to the entrapment defense, an individual who has been encouraged to commit a
crime by law enforcement officials can allege that the government's conduct was so
outrageous that it violated his due process rights. 32
 This section of the note will examine
the evolution of these defenses to determine how they applied to the ABSCAM scenario.
A. Entrapment
The defense of entrapment. is rooted firmly in the American criminal justice sys-
tem.33
 Traditionally, there have been two tests which courts have employed to determine
whether an individual has been entrapped: the subjective test and the objective test. The
subjective test, which has been adopted by the United States Supreme Court 34 and most
state courts,35 fOcuses on the predisposition of the accused in determining whether
entrapment occurred. 36 Predisposition is determined by examining whether the defen-
dant. was already prone to commit the act. for which the government merely supplied the
opportunity, or whether the government persuaded an otherwise innocent. person to
commit the crime. 37
 In contrast to the subjective approach, an objective test fOr entrap-
ment has been advocated by several Supreme Court justices, 38 and by numerous commen-
tators,39
 but has been employed in only a small number of state courts." In the objective
32 United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973).
33 The United States Supreme Court first recognized entrapment as a defense in Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. at 452. Tennessee is the only state which does not recognize the defense.
Comment: Entrapment in Tennessee, 45 TENN. L. REv. 57, 59 (1977). For a listing of the cases or
statutes which recognize entrapment in the forty-nine remaining states, see Comment: Causation and
Intention in the Entrapment Defense, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv, 859, 859-60 n.3 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Causation].
34 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 451-52. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 440
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
35 See, e.g., United States v. Webster, 649 F.2d 346, 351 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335, 340 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Watson, 489 F.2d 504, 511 (3d Cir.
1973); Tyson v. State, 361 So.2d 1182, 1186 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978); State v. Matheson, 363 A.2d
716, 719 (Me. 1976). See infra note 40 for a list of those jurisdictions which do not follow the
subjective test.
36 United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 433.
37 Id. at 440 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
38 Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 411-45 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at
382-85 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at '458-59 (Roberts, J„
concurring).
39 See, e.g.., L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE, & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 268-72 (1967);
Donnelly Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agents Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091,
1106 - 08, 11 I 1 - 12 (1951); Goldstein, For Harold Laswell: Some Reflections on Human Dirtily, Entrapment,
Informed Consent and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 687-90 (1975); Sagarin & MacNamara, The
Problem of Entrapment, 16 CRIM. & DELINct. 363, 376-78 (1970); Williams, The Defense of Entrapment and
Related Problems in Criminal Prosecutions, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 399, 417 (1959); Note, Entrapment: A
Source of Continuing Confusion in the Lower Courts, 5 Am. J. TRIAL Anvoc. 293, 303 (1981); Recent
Developments, Entrapment — Predisposition of Defendant Crucial Factor in Entrapment Defense, 59
CORNELL L. REV. 546, 566 -68 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Predisposition]; Comment, Entrapment: A
Critical Discussion, 37 Mo. L. REV. 633, 659 (1972); Comment, Entrapment by Federal Officers, N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1033, 1039 (1958).
40
 Four states have accepted the objective test judicially. See Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226,
229-30 (Alaska 1969); People v. Barraza, 23 Ca1,3d 675, 689-91, 591 P.2d 947, 955-56, 153 Cal. Rptr.
459, 467-68 (1979); State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375, 382 (Iowa 1974); People v. Turner, 390 Mich.
7, 22, 210 N.W.2d 336, 342 (1973). North Dakota, New Hampshire, Hawaii, Pennsylvania, and Utah
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test, the concern is not with the predisposition of the particular defendant, but with the
conduct of the government officials and the degree of instigation or inducement.' That
is, the court must look to the scope of government influence as it would affect the
"average person"42 and ignore the accused's subjective state of mind." The development
of these two tests deserves attention.
The subjective test has been the sole test applied by the United States Supreme Court
in four landmark entrapment cases beginning with Sotreiit v. United States:" In Sorrells, a
government agent convinced the defendant to sell him a hall' gallon of whiskey.' 5 After
being indicted for possession and sale of' whiskey in violation of the National Prohibition
Act, the defendant pleaded not guilty and asserted the defense of entrapment." The
Supreme Court, relying on statutory interpretation"' and lower court precedent," de-
termined that "a sense of justice" did not allow for otherwise innocent people to be
"lured" into the commission of crimes by government officials and then to be punished as
if they had been predisposed to commit the act." Thus the defendant was found to be not.
guilty based on entrapment. As such, the predisposition of the defendant became the
Supreme Court's test for entrapment.
The Supreme Court also addressed the entrapment defense in Sherman v. United
States." In Sherman, government officials arrested an individual whom they had coaxed,
through a government informer, into selling narcotics to that informer. 51 Although the
Court found entrapment to have existed," it did so strictly by evaluating the accused's
subjective state of mind which manifested both hesitancy and lack of predisposition.53
Furthermore, because neither of the parties raised the issue, the Court refused to amend
the doctrine of entrapment in light of the objective theory."' Thus, the subjective theory
remained ruling law.
In the two remaining Supreme Court entrapment cases, the defendants specifically
have adopted the objective test by statute. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 702-237 (1976); N.H. REv, STAT.
ANN. § 626:5 (1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11 (1976); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, 313 (Purdon
1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303 (1978).
'' United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 440-42 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
42 Justice Frankfurter, in Sherman v. United States, stated that the objective test was designed to
prohibit inducements which would he likely to cause crimes by law-abiding persons:
This does not mean that the police may not act so as to detect those engaged in criminal
conduct and ready and willing to commit further crimes should the occasion arise. .. . It
does mean that in holding out inducements they should act in such a manner as is likely
to induce to the commission of crime only these persons and not others who would
normally avoid crime and through self-struggle resist ordinary temptations.
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 269, 383-84 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also
Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 229 (Alaska 1969) (government inducement would be improper if it
"would be effective to persuade an average person . . . to commit . . . an offense.").
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 459 (Roberts, J., concurring).
" 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
" hi. at 439.
" hi. at 438.
47 Id. at 445-48. •
" Id. at 443-45.
" Id. at 448.
50 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
s' Id. at 371.
22 Id. at 373.
53 hi. at 373-76.
" Id. at 376.
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asked the Court to reconsider the entrapmenttheory as set forth in Sorrel's and Sherman in
terms of certain fundamental principles of due process. In United States v. Russell,"
government agents supplied an illicit drug manufacturer with an essential narcotic ingre-
dient and then arrested him for the subsequent manufacture and sale of the drug. 56
Refusing to overturn the long-standing subjective theory precedents of Sorrel's and
Sherman," the Russell Court applied the subjective standard of entrapment to the facts of
the case, and held that the defendant was clearly predisposed to commit the crime and,
accordingly, denied the claim of ent•apment."
The Court arrived at a similar holding in the more recent case of Hampton v. United
States." In Hampton, petitioner was arrested after participating in an illegal drug sale
arranged by a government informant." Although the defendant claimed entrapment,
the Supreme Court upheld the conviction."' In an opinion reminiscent of Russell, the
Hampton Court ruled out the possibility that a claim of entrapment could ever be based
upon governmental misconduct if the predisposition of the defendant has been estab-
lished. 62 Thus, the subjective theory of entrapment continued to be the appropriate test
despite suggested alternatives.
The objective test for entrapment is the primary alternative test which has been
advocated in the concurring or dissenting opinions of each of these four Supreme Court
cases. The origins of the objective test can be traced to Justice Roberts' concurring opinion
in Sorrel's."' Justice Roberts foresaw problems associated with the use of the subjective
test. He maintained that the danger existed that a defendant's predisposition to commit.
the crime could be determined erroneously by reliance on the defendant's prior reputa-
tion or acts." Justice Roberts, therefore, claimed that the proper test for entrapment
should not be predisposition, but the conduct of the government officials and the degree
of the instigation and inducement." Similarly, in Sherman, justice Frankfurter warned
that despite the defendant's past crimes and general predisposition, the defendant might
not have committed these particular crimes."" He also felt that an "objective test" of
entrapment was necessary to regulate police conduct." The dissents in Russell" and
Hampton" echoed these concerns and advocated the adoption of the "objective lest."
Despite such advocacy, the objective view of entrapment has remained only a minority
view.
B. Due Process
Although in both Russell and Hampton the Supreme Court. reaffirmed the subjective
test For entrapment, the Court considered the notion that the government's conduct
as 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
5"
	 at 424 - 27.
" Id. at 434 - 36.
" Id. at 436.
s"
	 U.S. 484 (1976).
"° Id. at 485-87.
Id. at 490-91.
62
 Id. at 488-90.
"3 287 U.S. at 459.
64
 Id. at 458
- 59.
66
 Id. al 459.
" 356 U.S. at 383 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
67 Id. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
" 411 U.S. at 436-51.
" 425 U.S. at 492-500.
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could be so outrageous that it would constitute a violation of the defendant's due process
rights." The Russell Court determined that "we may some day be presented with a
situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due
process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes
to obtain a conviction." 71 The Court emphasized, however, that "the instant case is not of
that breed." 72 Although the Hampton Court refused to consider the appropriateness of
the government's conduct," the concurring and dissenting Justices addressed the issue.
The concurring opinion, written by Justice Powell and joined by Justice Blackmun,'"
maintained that although the subjective test stood," a defendant found to be predisposed
could claim that outrageous government conduct violated his due process rights.'" The
concurring Justices found, however, that. the government conduct in this case was not
outrageous." The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Brennan and joined by Justices
Stewart and Marshall,'" stated that the objective test was proper and that predisposition
did not matter." In examining the facts of the case, the dissent concluded that the
government conduct was outrageous enough to require dismissal." Thus, a majority of
the Justices in Hampton found that, although predisposition is the test for entrapment,
even a predisposed defendant may be released if' there is outrageous government conduct
because such conduct is a due process violation. The Justices who supported the clue
process defense, however, failed to define what type of governmental conduct would be
considered outrageous. Furthermore, only twice has a federal appellate court found
outrageous government conduct to exist. These two cases, United States v. Archer" and
United States v. Tutigg" will now be discussed.
The defendants in Archer accepted bribes from an undercover FBI agent in return
for assurances that a grand jury would not return an indictment against the FBI agent."
Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided Archer on the other grounds," the
court did address the issue of outrageous government conduct." The court reasoned
that, in Archer, the government "authorized" its agents to engage in crimes which were
7° United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32; Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 493. For a
further discussion of a due process defense in an entrapment situation, see Gershman, Entrapment,
Shocked Consciences, and the Staged Arrest, 66 MINN. L. REV. 567, 582-611 (1982); Note, Entrapment —
A Due Process Defense — What Process is Due?, 11 Sw. U.L. REV. 663, 665-77 (1979).
" United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 432.
" /d. at 431-32.
" Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 490.
" Id. at 491-95 (Powell, J. and Blackmun, J., concurring).
". Id. at 492 n.2 (Powell, J. and Blackmun, J., concurring).
" Id, at 493 (Powell, J. and Blackmun, J., concurring).
" Id. at 491 (Powell, J., and Blackmun, J., concurring).
78 Id. at 495-500 (Brennan, J.; Stewart, J.; and Marshall, J.; dissenting).
" Id. at 496-97 (Brennan, J.; Stewart, J.; and Marshall, J., dissenting).
'° Id. at 498-500 (Brennan, J.; Stewart, J.: and Marshall, J., dissenting).
" 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973).
" 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
" 486 F.2d at 672-74. The defendants in Archer were Leon Wasserherger, an associate of a
Manhattan hailhondsman, and Norman Archer and Frank Klein who were both attorneys. id. The
arrest and detention of the FBI agent were part of the ruse, but the grand jury was legitimate. Id.
84 Id. at 681-83. The Archer court reversed the convictions on the grounds that the evidence was
insufficient to show a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate the Travel Act. Id.
85 Id. at 676-77, 682.
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"quite independent of the crimes the defendants committed."' This conduct, the court
found, was completely reprehensible," and the court added that it hoped that the "lesson
of this case- would obviate the necessity for any case to reach them which would spe-
cifically require the court to find that the government conduct violated clue process of
law."
Following the Archer opinion, the United Stales Court. of Appeals for the Third
Circuit., in United Slates v. Twigg" held that the government's conduct was outrageous and
violated the defendant's due process rights." Twigg involved the arrest of two illicit drug
manufacturers to whom government agents had furnished essential chemicals, equip-
ment, materials and an entire farmhouse/laboratory for manufacturing certain narcot-
ics." Considering the defendant's claim of entrapment, the court adhered to precedent
and determined that predisposition was the sole basis For disproving entrapment ,! )2 The
court concluded that this defendant was, in fact, predisposed." The Twigg court then
examined whether the government's conduct was outrageous and found that the police
involvement was so overreaching that it barred prosecution as a matter of due process. 9'
In reaching this decision, the court weighed the extent of government. conduct. to deter-
mine where predisposition ended and government inducement. took over. 95 Emphasizing
that the government initiated the plan, supplied otherwise Unavailable ingredients and
took advantage of the weakness of the defendants," the Twigg court concluded that the
government actions "reached 'a demonstrable level of out rageousness.' "7 Consequently,
the court held that the extensive police involvement violated the defendant's due process
rights." Twigg, therefore, stands for the proposition that government conduct can reach
a level so outrageous that it warrants dismissal of criminal charges on due process
grounds.
From the foregoing discussion of case law, two conclusions may he drawn. First, the
subjective test of entrapment, which focuses on the defendant's predisposition, is the only
Supreme Court approved test for entrapment. Second, even with a predisposed defen-
dant, government conduct may be sufficiently outrageous to support a defense of' viola-
tion of due process. Keeping these conclusions in mind, it is necessary to examine the
individual ABSCAM scenarios and evaluate their holdings in light of' both the adequacy
of the predisposition test, and the consideration given government conduct.
II. THE ABSCAM SCENARIOS AND DEFENSES
Each time a middleman brought an unsuspecting official into the ABSCAM investi-
gation, one of four distinguishable scenarios was begun. These scenarios were: first, the
86 It at 675. These crimes included perjury before judges and grand juries, misleading a police
investigation, and "needlessly injecting the federal government into a matter of state concern." Id. at
672.
" Id. at 677.
"
89
 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
" Id. at 380.
91 Id. al 375-76.
Id. at 376.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 377.
" Id, at 380-82.
96 Id, at '381.
" Id. at 380.
Id. at 377.
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basic and most common, the "asylum scenario";" second, the more complicated version,
the "stock and loan scenario";'°° third, the fact pattern with which the courts had the least
trouble returning a guilty verdict, the "Alexandro scenario"; 101 and finally, a slight, but
distinguishable variation of the asylum scenario, the "Kelly scenario." 1 "2
A. The Asylum Scenario
The simplest and most common approach used by the FBI was the "asylum scenario."
In this scenario, the unsuspecting middlemen contacted influential public officials and
introduced them to undercover FBI agents who offered the officials cash in exchange for
assurances of action on the sheik's behalf in immigration matters.'" Each time the agents
made an offer, they phrased it slightly differently and promised different amounts of
money depending on the importance of the individual.
George X. Schwartz and Harry P. jannoni, both influential members of the Philadel-
phia City Council, were informed that the sheik was interested in building an elaborate
hotel complex in Philadelphia.'" The FBI offered them money, assuring them that
acceptance of the money would be an expression to the sheik ()I' their "friendliness,"'" as
well as an assurance that the councilmen would use their official positions to expedite
completion ot' the hotel complex.'" Subsequently, the councilmen accepted the money.'"
Both men were indicted and eventually convicted of bribery and related crimes.'" A
former United States Congressman from Philadelphia, Michael 0. Myers accepted
$50,000 1 °° before ABSCAM cameras in a hotel room in return for a promise to introduce
into Congress a private bill to enable the sheik to enter the United States as a permanent
citizen."° Although Myers claimed at trial that he was only "play acting" to swindle the
sheik,'" the jury refused to believe the claim and Myers was convicted of bribery,
conspiracy and unlawful interstate activity. 12 Another former United States Representa-
tive from Philadelphia, Raymond F. Letterer, was videotaped accepting $50,000" 3 in
exchange for a promise to assist the sheik in his immigration matters.'" A jury apparently
found the videotape evidence "overwhelming"" 5 and returned guilty verdicts on all
09 United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1212-13 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
1 " United States v. Williams, 529 F. Supp. 1085, 1090-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
"" United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34, 36 - 38 (2(1 Or. 1982).
1 ' United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1463-67 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
103 See United States v. jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1195 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
1 b' Id. at 1184.
1"4 Id. at 1194. The FBI agents posing as the sheik's representatives indicated that, to the Arab
Mind, accepting monetary payments was merely a token of friendship. Id.
1 " Id. at 1184.
107 Id. Schwartz, the President of the Council, received $30,00 while jannotti received only
$10,000. Id.
"" United States v. jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 580 - 81 (3d Or. 1982).
1 " United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. at 1212. Myers apparently only kept $15,000. He
divided the remainder between Errichetti, Criden, and Criden's law partner, Louis C. Johanson. Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
" 3 Id. at 1213. Lederer only kept $5,000. He divided the remaining amount between Criden,
Errichetti, and Johanson. Id.
114 Id.
"5 Id.
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counts.' Finally, United States Representatives Frank Thompson, Jr. of New Jersey and
John M. Murphy of New York were each offered a bribe termed "walking around money"
in October of 1979.' 17
 At an FBI-arranged rendezvous captured on videotape,
Thompson handed Murphy a briefcase containing $50,000." 8
 Both men pleaded igno-
rance as to the contents of the case, 19
 but the jury believed otherwise and found both
defendants guilty. 120
Of the six major defendants who were indicted under the "asylum scenario," only
three chose to allege entrapment. 121 Two of those defendants, Jannotti and Schwartz,
were successful with the defense in the district con rt." 2
 The court first determined that
the subjective test of predisposition was the appropriate standard for entrapment. 123
Under this test, the court observed the proper way to determine the existence of predis-
position was to see if the government induced the defendants to commit a crime they
would not have been likely to commit otherwise. 12 ' Analyzing the facts at hand, the
Jannotti court. concluded that the government agents had offered inducements that were
so au ractive, that the mere acceptance of the money did not prove predisposition.'" The
court based this conclusion on three factors. First, the $10,000 and $30,000 gifts were "a
substantial temptation to commit a first. offense."'" Second, the defendants, by agreeing
to help in the construction of the hotel complex, bad done nothing inconsistent with their
obligations as members of the City Council." 7
 Third, the government agents had led the
defendants to believe that if they did not accept the money, the hotel project would not.
come to Philadelphia. 128
 This evidence, the court maintained, was insufficient, as a matter
of law, to establish the defendants' predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Conse-
quently, the court held that the defendants were entrapped.' 3° Furthermore, in discuss-
ing a possible due process violation, the court, referring to both the Twigg and Archer
decisions, 13 t weighed the importance of apprehending corrupt public officials against the
116 Id.
" 7 Id. at 1214. The "sheik's representatives" offered Murphy a monetary sum in return for an
assurance from Murphy that he would "meet with them." Id. As a result of the failure on Murphy's
part to commit his Congressional interests and services to the sheik the jury found him not guilty of
bribery. Id. His acceptance of the money, however, as well as his request for financing from the sheik
to acquire a Puerto Rican shipping company led the jury to return guilty verdicts for criminal
gratuity, conflict of interest and conspiracy. Id.
"A - Id.
lip Id.
120 Id.
12 ' Lederer, Jannotti and Schwartz alleged entrapment. United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. at
1218; United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. at 1202.
122 United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. at 1205.
122 Id. at 1187 - 97. The Jannotti court relied on four Supreme Court opinions, see infra notes
44-80 and accompanying text, as well as a Third Circuit decision, United States v. Watson, 489 F.2d
504 (3d Cir. 1973).
129 United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. at 1190. Although the district court said it was
applying the subjective test, it did pay close attention to the amount of government inducement
involved, which is the standard of the objective test. See id. at 1200.
' 25 Id.
128 id .
127 Id.
120 Id.
120 Id .
ISO Id. at 1205.
11 Id. at 1203.
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propriety of governmental subterfuge. 132 In doing so, the court determined that the
combination of offering the bribes, providing generous financial inducements and even
appealing, in effect, to the accuseds' civic duly by offering to build a hotel which would
benefit the whole city, was a violation of the defendants' right to due process through
outrageous government conduct . 133 The asylum scenario, therefore, in at least one court's
opinion, overstepped certain constitutional and ethical limits.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals which reviewed the fan -no/1i case, however,
disagreed with the findings of the district. court and reinstated the guilty verdicts.'" The
appeals court, relying more heavily on the videotape evidence,'" rejected the district.
court's finding that the government had offered the defendants overwhelming tempta-
tions.'" In reaching its decision, the court emphasized four facts: First, $10,000 or
$30,000 is not so large a sum as to overcome an official's natural reluctance to accept a
bribe. 137 Second, a reasonable jury could find that the councilmen were clearly com-
promising their positions as elected officials by involving themselves in the hotel proj-
ect,' 39 rather than merely offering "friendship" to the sheik.' 39 Third, there was in-
sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the project would not have
come to Philadelphia if the councilmen had not accepted the money) 4 ° Fourth, if the
defendants, as a matter of law, were truly not predisposed to accept a bribe, they could
simply have refused."' Moreover, the court of appeals reversed the district court's
finding of a clue process violation," 2 careful distinguishing Twigg 143 and Archer. 144 Wary
of adopting an objective standard of entrapment disguised as a due process defense," 5
the court determined that as long as undercover bribery operations are not. "outrageous"
they may be conducted." 6
The remaining four asylum scenario defendants, all joined in the Myers case, were
' 32 Id. at 1204.
13' Id.
' 34 United States v. jannoui, 673 F.2d 578, 581 (1982).
"I Id. at 582-89. The Third Circuit's opinion quotes lengthy segments of the tapes, and
emphasizes that these defendants greedily took their bribes without. exhibiting any signs of hesita-
tion. Id. at 606.
f" Id. at 603.
' 37 Id. at 599.
"8 Id. at 600-01.
79 Id. at 600. The district court had been impressed by the defendant's argument that the
sheik's representatives had insisted that the money was not to be used in exchange for the council-
man's vote, but rather, as a comfort for the sheik's "Arab mind" which they claimed could lint trust a
man until that man accepted a large sum of the sheik's money. United States v. jannotti, 501 F. Stipp.
at 1194. The Third Circuit discou ntedI this argument, United States v. jannoui, 673 F.2d at 60.
1 " United States v. jannotti, 673 F.2d at 602-03.
"' Id. at 606.
142 Id. at 610.
143 Id. at 608. The court observed that in Twigg the government provided the defendant with
essential materials necessary for the criminal conduct, Id. The court maintained, however, that in the
ABSCAM investigation the government merely provided the opportunity for the defendants to sell
their political influence, a "commodity" which the defendants already possessed. Id.
"4 Id. The court noted that while the government action in Archer caused harm to third persons,
no such injury was caused in ABSCA M. Id. The court neglected to consider, however, that an injury
did occur in that the councilmen's constituents were deprived of the services of a non-corrupted
public servant.
145 Id.
"s Id. at 609.
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equally unsuccessful with their defense strategies.'" These strategies included defenses
of objective entrapment "8 and clue process violations, 149
 using the latter to attack both
the general nature and the specific operations of ABSCAM. In each case, the Myers court
rejected the objective theory of entrapment based on "clear federal precedents that reject
objective entrapment." 15° Furthermore, the court denied the due process defense because
it believed the government conduct fell far short of "outrageousness."'" The court
maintained that ABSCAM merely set out a "honey pot' and, at any time, the defen-
dants could have refused, as did three legislators.'" The court also determined that the
government conduct was less extensive than in Hampton,'" a case where the Supreme
Court found no outrageousness.' 55
 Finally, regarding the need for and reliability of
ABSCAM-like investigations, the court emphasized the value of uncovering political
corruption.' 56
 The court also added that, thanks to the videotape evidence, these trials
1 " Only one of these defendants, Congressman Lederer, pleaded traditional, subjective en-
trapment. United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. at 1224. The Myers court noted that the decision on
the remaining defendants' parts not to plead entrapment was not an oversight, but rather, a
calculated risk of their defense strategies. Id. at 1224 n.13. Although the Myers court does not
speculate on why the remaining defendants chose not to plead subjective entrapment, see id. at 1224,
substantial evidence existed to allow a jury conviction. Id. Furthermore, it appears that, at one time or
another, Myers, Thompson, and Murphy had made pretrial motions to dismiss the case on due
process grounds, thus requiring only a hearing and saving themselves from a highly publicized trial.
United States v. Myers, 510 F. Stipp. 319, 320 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). Of course the strategy backfired as
District Court Judge Mishlen reserved decision on the motions until the conclusion of the govern-
ment's case at trial. Id. at 323. The motion were subsequently denied. United States v. Myers, 527 F.
Supp. at 1251.
' 48 United States v. Myers, 527 E. Supp. at 1224-25.
14 ' Id. at 1225. In addition to alleging outrageous government conduct, the defendants claimed
that their due process rights also were violated by the FBI's use of Melvin Weinberg, a known and
untrustworthy criminal, id. at 1239; Weinberg's receipt of contingent payments from the FBI and his
failure to pay taxes, id. at 1240; and the excessive pre-indictment publicity leaks, id. at 1242. The
district court in Myers rejected these claims, maintaining that these actions had not deprived the
defendants of any due process rights. Id. at 1240-42.
' 5° Id. at 1225. The court stated that it would be improper to adopt the objective standard
because it would constitute a fundamental change in law, and as such was only within the province of
the Supreme Court or Congress. Id.
1 " Id.
152 Id. at 1226. The court quoted confidence-man Weinberg's testimony at trial that, "[w]e put
out the word that money was available, we had a honey pot and the flies came." Id.
' 53 Id. at 1225. The Myers court contended that if the inducements had been truly outrageous,
Senator Pressler and Congressmen Pattern and Murtha would have accepted. Id.
'" Id. TheJannotti court noted that in Hampton activity by the government on both "sides" of an
illegal narcotics sale in supplying the defendant with heroin and then arranging for an FBI agent to
buy it was not outrageous. Id. Therefore, the court reasoned, activity on one side, as when govern-
ment agents offer money to politicians, "may not be outrageous, either." Id. The court emphasized
that "a closer analogy to Hampton would be it' the FBI, in order to prosecute middlemen Crider and
Errichen.i, had not only offered them bribe money, but also supplied them with "undercover"
Congressmen to accept the bribe." Id. at 1225-26 n.15. This does not, however, justify the court's
a fortiori conclusions regarding the bribery of Congressmen because this is an act which, by its very
nature, cannot have the government working on "both sides" because one side must be the unsus-
pecting Congressman.
'" See supra notes 73-SO and accompanying text.
' 5° United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. at 1229.
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were perhaps as reliable as any trial could ever hope to be.'" Due process violations and
entrapment, therefore, were not found in any of the "asylum scenario" cases.
B. The "Stock and Loan" Scenario
A slightly more complicated scheme led to the indictments and convictions of former
United States Senator Harrison A. Williams of New Jersey. Camden Mayor Errichetti,
acting as middleman, set up an "investment. group" which included himself, Senator
Williams, and four others.'" According to Errichetti, the purpose of the group was to
organize a titanium mine and a processing plant.'" The group approached the FBI
agents in an attempt to obtain $100 million in financing from the sheik.'" Senator
Williams met with unidentified FBI agents posing as the sheik and his representatives on
seven occasions.' 61 During the last of these meetings, Senator Williams actually refused a
cash payment which was offered in exchange for his assistance in the sheik's immigration
to the United States.' 62 Despite this refusal, the jury found that, at previous meetings with
the sheik, Williams had agreed to use his position as Senator to obtain government
contracts for titanium in exchange for the sheik's financial backing of the mine.' 63 Thus,
the jury found Williams guilty of several bribery related crimes.' 64
At trial, Senator Williams alleged both entrapment and due process defenses,'"
neither with any success.'" Williams' entrapment defense was based on what he consid-
ered insufficient evidence of prediposition to accept bribes,'" and a. lack of prior
suspicion on the part of the investigators.'" The district court disagreed, however,
holding that the evidence at Williams' trial was sufficient to convince a jury of the
Senator's predisposition.'" Moreover, the district court stated that the government did
not need to suspect an individual of criminal activity to initiate an investigation.' 7" Senator
Williams' argument that government officials violated his due process rights by their
outrageous conduct included four points: First, Senator Williams alleged that the FBI
"coached" him into saying and doing as he had before the video cameras. 17 ' Second, the
agents used certain on-camera verbal ploys which inierrupted his explanations of why he
was refusing the bribe.'" Third, an internal FBI memorandum existed which concluded
137 Id. at 1229-30.
1 " United States v. Williams, 529 F. Supp. 1085,1090-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). This group included
Alexander Feinberg, Williams' attorney; George Katz, a New jersey businessman who died before
going to trial; and Sandy Williams, a long-time friend of the Senator against whom no charges were
brought on account of his decision to cooperate with the authorities. Id. Senator Williams was to be a
silent partner in the corporation, owning 18% of the stock. Id. at 1090.
159 Id. at 1090.
mu Id.
161 id.
162 Id.
163
 Id. at 1092.
1 " Id. at 1092-93.
"5 Id. at 1093.
166 Id. at 1107.
1 " Id. at 1096.
166 Id.
169 Id.
' 71) Id.
' 71 Id. at 1097.
172 Id. at 1099.
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that Williams should not have been brought before a grand jury. 13 Fourth, Senator
Williams, and all the ABSCAN1 defendants were singled out for investigation because they
were supporters of then Presidential candidate Senator Edward . Kennedy. 17" The district
court rejected all these allegations, asserting that either they were completely unsup-
ported by evidence or that, even if the allegations were true, they did not deny the
defendant any "fundamental fairness" or similar "due process requirements."i 7 ' Neither
entrapment nor a clue process violation, therefore, existed in the stock-and-loan scenario,
C. The Alexandra Scenario
The third scheme employed by the FBI resulted in the conviction of a criminal
investigator with the Immigration and Naturalization Service name Alexander Alexan-
dro, jr."" Alexandro came to the FBI's attention through an unsuspecting middleman
named Alfred Carpentier, a Long Island businessman.'" Carpentier originally met with
FBI agents at one of the sheik's lavish parties and advised them that he and Alexandro
would help the sheik obtain a "green card" which was necessary for the sheik's immigra-
tion to the United States. 178
 Rather than involve the sheik, the FBI agents requested that
Alexandro obtain a green card for an Irish alien friend of the sheik. 179
 Alexandra,
thereafter, took complete control of the scenario, concocting an elaborate and highly
illegal scheme involving a contrived marriage and subsequent divorce for the alien in
order to obtain the necessary documents.'" Alexandro then met with the sheik's rep-
resentatives before hidden cameras, explained his elaborate plan in full detail, quoted a
price of $15,000 and received an initial payment of $2,000 from an agent.'"' Alexandro
was eventually arrested, indicted and convicted on three criminal counts.'"
Alexander Alexandro simply alleged that the government's actions violated his clue
process rights,'" apparently because his complete acquiescence in the criminal activities
in which he took part foreclosed any claim of entrapment.'" Ater considering the facts of
the case, the court concluded that not only did the facts show a complete lack of coercion
'" Id. at 1100. The memorandum stated that, because Senator Williams had not accepted a
bribe, certain FBI officials believed that there was no case against him. Id. The court maintained t hat
an internal memorandum evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of a case did not preclude the
government from proceeding with its investigation. Id. at 1100-01.
'" Id. at 1101. Originally, Senator Williams suggested that there was a direct connection
between his support of Senator Kennedy and the investigation. Id. He later amended his allegation
by maintaining that, as a supporter of Kennedy, he was "negatively selected" in that he didn't have
any contacts in the Justice Department or FBI who would have "tipped him off" regarding the
investigation. Id.
' 75 Id. at 1099-1101.
'" United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2(1 34, 35 (2d Cir. 1982).
'" Id. at 36.
17' Id.
179 Id.
18 ° Id. at 37-38.
181 Id.
"" Id. at 35, 38. These counts included receiving a bribe, conflict of interest, and conspiracy to
receive bribes. Id. at 35.
In Id. at 39.
I" Id. at 41. The court reported that Alexandro explained his incriminating acts by claiming
that he was trying to investigate his would-be corrupters. Id. at 38. The court emphasized, however,
that Alexandro had failed to inform his supervisors, the FBI or the police of his "investigation."1d. at
39.
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on the part of the government 1 R 5 but that Alexandro's conduct demonstrated the exact
type of elusive, difficult-to-detect covert crime which justifies undercover government
activities.'" The most incriminating element which distinguished the Alexandra scenario
from the other ABSCAM cases was that Alexandra, himself, became the "driving and
persistent force behind the intricate scheine."" 7 Alexandra's conduct made it unneces-
sary for the government to engage in any arguably unconstitutional activity.'" Thus, no
due process violation or entrapment existed in the Alexandra scenario.
D. The Kelly Scenario
The final variation in the ABSCAM investigation involved a former United States
Representative, Richard Kelly of Florida,'" and contains several details which distin-
guished it from the other three scenarios.
Certain facts were well established due to electronic recording devices.'" The evi-
dence indicated that Kelly became involved in ABSCAM through three middlemen, more
than had been used to involve any other ABSCAM defendant."' The FBI agents initially
met with businessman William Rosenberg and expressed their desire to recruit Con-
gressmen."' Rosenberg contacted an accountant and friend, Stanley Weisz, who men-
tioned this proposition to his longtime business associate Eugene Citazio. 193 Ciuzio ap-
proached one of the FBI agents and convinced him that he would be able to influence
Congressman Kelly."' Consequently, the FB1 agents described to Ciuzio the standard
ABSCAM proposition: a very attractive investment by the sheik in the Congressman's
district, and money in return for help with the sheik's immigration concerns.'" Ciuzio
agreed and contacted Kelly with the sheik's proposal.'" At trial, Kelly testified that he was
interested only in the legitimate investment aspect of the deal, which he claimed he had
made clear to Ciuzio." 7 Nevertheless, at a subsequent meeting, an FB1 agent offered
Kelly $25,000 as an initial payment. on a $100,000 bribe for his assistance with immigra-
tion matters.'" Kelly refused the offer twice and the agent left. the room to speak with a
government attorney who was monitoring the meeting in the basement.'" Although their
conversation was only vaguely recalled,"° the attorney told the agent that Kelly was
merely "being cute." 20 ' After meeting with the attorney, the agent returned to Kelly,
"5
 Id. at 40.
189
 Id. at 42.
197 id.
"" See id. at 41
-42.
' $9 United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C. 1982).
' 9° See id. at 368-70.
191 Id. at 367.
192 Id.
193 Id .
194 Id.
1115 ht.
"6 Id.
197 id.
198 Id. at 370. Ciuzio informed the FBI agents that he wanted to take the bribe to Kelly alone,
but the agents refused. Id. at 367. Before Kelly finally met with the agents. Ciuzio frantically
attempted to convince confidence-man Weinberg not to offer the Congressman any money, thereby
"making him a ... hood." Id. at 368-69.
1 " Id. at 370.
291) Id .
291 Id.
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persisted in his offer and soon after, Kelly accepted. 202 Kelly was indicted and found
guilty on three counts.'" All the verdicts, however, were dismissed by the district. court 204
which held that the government's conduct in ABSCAM violated due process. 2"
Emphasizing that testing virtue of those previously unsuspected of criminal activity is
an unacceptable form of law enforcement,'" the district court maintained that, at best,
this type of police work results in "prosecution for the sake of prosecution."'" Assuming,
arguendri, that this is permissible, the court continued, the temptations offered by the FBI
must not exceed those which a politician ordinarily would encounter. 200 The court
maintained that this limit was well exceeded in the Kelly scenario.209 Emphasizing that the
agents continued to offer the bribe to Congressman Kelly after he had rejected it twice,'"
the court reasoned that, in the "real world," no criminal would persist with such an offer
for fear of his own apprehension.'" Although the court expressed deep chagrin that the
defendant eventually did take the money, 2 ' 2 it determined that the government's persis-
tent battle with the defendant's conscience rose above the level of offensiveness to that of
"outrageousness," 2 " This outrageousness, the court concluded, exceeded the bounds of
law enforcement. 2 l 4
 In effect, this deviation from "real-world constraints" shifted the
criminal motivation from the defendant's predisposition to the government's outrageous
conduct.210 The court maintained that Kelly was "made into a criminal by his own
government."'" As such, the district. court dismissed the indictment.'"
The government. appealed the Kelly decision to the District of Columbia Circuit Court.
of Appeals which reinstated the guilty verdicts. 218 Reviewing the case solely on due
process' grounds,'" the circuit court rejected the district. court's "real world" lest of
government over-inducement.. 2 " While the district court reasoned that no real criminal
would persist with a bribe offer for fear of apprehension 2 21 the circuit court alternatively
stated that Congressman Kelly was in no way taken aback by the initial offer and,
202 N.
205 Id. at 364.
2 " Id. at 365.
200 Id. at 376.
2 ° 6 Id. at 373.
207 Id.
" 0 Id. at 374.
2 ° 0 Id. at 374-76.
210 Id. at 374.
211 Id. at 376.
212 Id. at 375.
213
	 at 376.
211
215 Id. at 377.
210 id.
217 Id.
218
	 F.2d 1460, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Three opinions were filed. The first opinion was per
curiam. Id. The second was filed by Circuit Judge MacKinnon. Id. at 1461-74. The third was filed by
Circuit Judge Ginsburg. Id. at 1474-77. The MacKinnon and Ginsburg opinions together constitute
the opinion of the court. Id. at 1461.
218
	
at 1468, n.48. The court maintained that. Kelly never aggressively pursued his claim of
entrapment and that, although the jury did consider the entrapment defense, the district court did
not specifically hold that Kelly had been entrapped as a matter of law. Id.
2" Id. at 1470, n.51.
221 See supra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
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therefore, the offer was within Kelly's "real world.'" 222 The court then discussed ABSCAM
in both general and specific terms so as to develop its own due process test.
The circuit court compared government involernent in ABSCAM to the Russell and
Hampton drug cases . 223 The court maintained that, in Russell and Hampton, the govern-
ment provided both the opportunity and the means to commit a crime, but that no due
process violation was held to exist in either case. 224 The court determined that, therefore,
no tine process violation could exist in ABSCAM where the government provided merely
the opportunity, and not the means, to commit a crime.225 The court then discussed the
specific claims which Kelly asserted in his defense. First, regarding the lack of any prior
suspicion of Kelly by the government, the court found that ABSCAM operatives did have
evidence, prior to the bribe offer, that Kelly was "fully aware that he was participating in
an illicit transaction,""G and from which they could conclude that "Kelly was, in fact,
corrupt ." 227 Second, regarding the use of convicted felon Weinberg, his compensation, 228
and his failure to record every conversation which he had held with Kelly's middlemen,
the court held that these facts were adequately considered by the trial jury and that Kelly
failed to explain how these factors would have added "anything of significance" to his
defense.229 Finally, regarding the multiple bribe offers which distinguished this scenario
from the others, the court reexamined Kelly's initial refusals and characterized them not
as rejections of bribes themselves, but as rejections of the manner in which the bribe was
to be paid.'" The court held, therefore, that the government had actually made only one
bribe offer, which Kelly accepted, and for which he should be found guilty.'
The circuit court in Kelly concluded with a second opinion filed by Circuit Judge
Ginsburg.'" In it, the court stated that, although the "real-world" test of the district court
was speculative, the circuit court 'night have applied it in Kelly, if "the slate were clear."233
In or her words, the court was bound by precedent not to "alter the contours of the
entrapment defense under a clue process cloak.'" The court added that "without.
further Supreme Court elaboration," the test fOr outrageous government conduct would
not be transgressed absent "coercion, violence or brutality to the person."" 5 According to
the court, because Congressman Kelly was not inflicted with "pain or physical or psycho-
logical coercion," no due process violation existed in the Kelly scenario as a result of
outrageous government cowl uct , 236
It is apparent both from the facts of their cases and their claimed defenses, that none
2 " 707 F.2d at 1470, n.51.
52f' Id. at 1470.
224 Id.
223 Id.
"8 Id. at 1471.
227 Id, The court cites the example that Kelly was asked to tall his middlemen from a "safe"
phone booth to discuss the deal, and then did so. Id. Additionally, the court mentioned that prior
even to enlisting Rosenberg in the scenario, one Congressman had already accepted a bribe. Id.
222 One court estimated Weinberg's total compensation for ABSCAM at about $225,000. United
States v. Weisz No. 82-2123, slip op. at n.5 (D,G. Cir. 1983).
22" 707 F.2d at 1472.
2" Id. al 1473.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 1474-77.
233
 Id. at 1475.
234 Id. at 1475-76.
223
	
at 1476.
"'' Id. at 1477.
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of the public officials, in their entrapment and due process claims, denied that they had
committed the acts of which they were accused. Rather, they claimed that certain ex-
tenuating circumstances required dismissal of their cases. Whether they claimed tradi-
tional entrapment or the more vague notion of a due process violation, it is evident that.
they were attempting to redirect the attention of the court to the conduct of the govern-
ment.. Each defendant net with differing degrees of success, ranging from Alexandro,
whom the court believed was just grasping for straws, to Kelly, Schwartz, and jannoni,
with whom at least their respective district courts agreed. The broad spectrum of resolu-
tions seems a result of more than just differing fact patterns. It seems to be due to a
variety of different, and often contradictory views, on the part of judges and juries, about
how the appropriate law should be applied to the facts of the ABSCAM scenarios. It is the
purpose of the next section of this note, therefore, to reexamine the theories of entrap-
ment and clue process, to discern how they should be applied to the crime of political
corruption.
Ill. THE FAILURE OF THE ABSCAM DEFENSES
Having examined the four ABSCAM scenarios, it is evident that the defendants in
each had it difficult time presenting their respective defenses. In fact, none succeeded to
the point of acquittal. This section of this note will submit that the failure of these
defenses had less to do with the merits of the cases than with t he manner in which the FBI
structured the scenarios. This contention will be advanced through a reevaluation of
modern entrapment and due process law as they pertain to t he ABSCAM scenarios. The
examination of entrapment will demonstrate the insufficiency of the subjective theory as a
defense for ABSCAM defendants in light of the particular structure of the ABSCAM
scenarios. The examination will also take into account the unavailability of the objective
theory as a defense, due to the clear federal precedents which have discarded this
alternative theory. Then, the examination of due process will investigate the refusal of
most ABSCAM courts to allow this defense, apparently due to a lack of precedents and
standards, and its likeness to the unsuccessful objective theory of entrapment,
A. Entrapment
Theoretically, entrapment occurs when an "unwary innocent, - as opposed to an
"unwary criminal," is apprehended. 2 " Traditionally, emrapment is limited to "victimless
crimes" such as bribery, gambling, prostitution, and contraband sales. It is difficult for the
government to prosecute such crimes because t here are no victims to come forward and
testify."' Thus, the government often resorts to undercover schemes to apprehend
individuals committing such crinies. 239 Moreover, in any crime where t here is a victim, or
where someone else's rights are endangered, police may not create opportunities for the
commission of these crimes."' The police cannot, for example, create opportunities for
someone to commit burglary, rape, or murder ." because in those cases, the police would
"7 Sherman v. united States, 356 U.S. at 372.
"" United States v. jannotti, 673 F.2d at 609. Livermore, Enforcement Workshop: ABSCAM
Entrapment, 17 CRIM. L, BULL. 69, 72 (1981).
2" See, e.g., United States v, jannotti, 501 F. Stipp. at 1193-99; United States v. Myers, 527 F,
Supp. at 1209-11.
240 United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d at 676 - 77. See Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police
Rulemaking, 53 Tex. 1., REv. 203, 283-86 (1975).
241
 United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d at 676-77.
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not merely be instigators, they would also be accomplices. In ABSCAM, the "crime"
involved was bribery. Entrapment, therefore, potentially could exist. Entrapment would
exist if, in offering the bribe, a government offiCial afforded the suspect not only the
opportunity to commit a crime, but also instigated or induced its commission by one not
ready or willing to commit it."' Thus, in evaluating the entrapment defense, courts must
determine whether the crime was a result of the defendant's willingness, or the govern-
ment's creativity and instigation. 243 Because of the Supreme Court precedent, all the
ABSCA NI courts made this determination through the subjective test of predisposition."'
Due to the facts of the ABSCAM investigation, the subjective test was not too easy to
apply. An individual's predisposition is only apparent in extreme situations. At one end of
the spectrum is a Congressman who may have offered his unsolicited services to the sheik
for certain sums, and at the other, is a Congressman who simply may have refused all
offers. Any fact pattern that falls within these extremes requires a more detailed evalua-
tion of the facts of the case to determine if the defendant was predisposed to commit the
crime.
One of the few actual enumerations of available standards for determining predis-
position was advocated by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Becker. 245 This test,
which the Myers court employed to the disadvantage of Congressman Lederer,"" involves
three factors for proving predisposition: first, an existing course of similar criminal
conduct; second, the accused's already formed design to commit the crime or similar
crimes; and third, his willingness to do so as evidenced by ready compliance."' Although
these three factors are aimed at determining whether a defendant had a predisposition to
commit the crimes,"" there are difficulties in applying the factors to the facts of a case. It
may be difficult for a court to examine character evidence without convicting individuals
on the basis of past criminal conduct.249 Such an examination might run into opposition
from evidence rules250 and could result in a constitutionally unsavory outcome for the
case. 2 " Also the willingness factor, which the Myers court emphasized, allows a jury to
place tremendous weight on the actual commission of the crime. 252 This, too is unaccept-
2-I2 United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 445 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
243 Id.
2'4 United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d at 1474; United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 597; United
States v. Williams, 529 F. Supp. at 1095-96; United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. at 1222.
212 62 F.2d 1007, 1008 (2d Cir. 1933).
2" United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. at 1242.
247 62 F.2d at 1008.
	21"
	 States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. at 1242.
2" United States v. Russell, 411 at 443.44 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Sherman v. United States,
356 U.S. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
270 Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) forbids the admission of evidence of "other crimes, wrongs
or acts to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith."
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
CJ: Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). In Robinson, petitioner was found guilty at
trial of being addicted to the use of narcotics based on admissions of occasional use of narcotics and
needle marks and scar tissue on his arm. Id. at 660 - 63. The Supreme Court overturned the
conviction, maintaining that to convict and punish an individual for his "status" as an addict, without
any supplementary evidence about his actual use of the drug within the prosecuting state, was "cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 666-67.
222
 United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. at 1242.
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able, since the acceptance of money, in and of itself', cannot prove predisposition to
bribery. If' it could, subjective entrapment would never exist; to accept the money would
prove guilt and to refuse  it would imply that there was no criminal act. The subjective test
is inequitable in the ABSCAM scenarios because of four factors: the use of videotape; the
lack of prior suspicion and the use of random targets; the mixture of legal offers with
illegal bribes; and the involvement of unsuspecting middlemen. Each of these elements
will now be discusseed.
The FBI's use of videotape to establish the ABSCAM defendants' criminal predispo-
sition hindered a reliable determination of such predisposition. Videotape, by its nature,
is compelling evidenc.e. 253 The Myers court went so far as to say that thanks to videotape
evidence, these trials were as reliable as any criminal trials could ever hope to be. 254
Admittedly, videotape is a reliable form of evidence for reproducing and proving physical
happenings, 255
 but for proving predisposition, its reliability is limited considerably by its
inability to photograph a defendant's "state of mind." 25 ' One study has determined that.
the videotape evidence used in ABSCAM was deceptive in terms of what the defendants
"said" versus what they actually "meant." 2 " According to Roger Shuy, a linguistics
professor at Georgetown University. the tapes were misleading in three ways. First, verbal
imprecisions which were actually ambiguous, taken in the context. of the ABSCAM
investigation, appeared to indicate guilt. 25 " Second, confidence-man Weinberg manipu-
lated and interrupted conversations so that only incriminating material was recorded.259
Third, clever editing and presentation of the tapes to jurors created false impressions."°
These ambiguities may have prevented jurors from distinguishing between guilt and
appearances of guilt.'" Consequently, while the use of videotape may have been ex-
tremely reliable and helpful to the government in its ability to prove that the defendants
physically took the money, it may have been extremely prejudicial in terms of character
evidence. Because it is a defendant's character that is key to his predisposition, jurors who
were presented with videotaped evidence of ready acquiescence may have felt compelled
253 United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d at 39; Boster, Miller & Fontes, Videotape in the
Courtroom: Effects in Live Trials, 14 TRIAL, June 1978 at 50.
254 United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. at 1229-30.
255 "Undoubtedly this process of reproducing movement, background, color and sound will
more and more be recognized by lawyers and judges as a valuable resource for adding vividness,
accuracy and entertainment to the presentation of facts." C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 181 (1954).
2 " See Hocking, Videotape in the Courtroom, i 4 TRIAL, April 1978 at 53-55. According to Hocking,
"when untrained observers rely on nonverbal information, they are unable to distinguish reliably
between when a person is lying and when he or she is telling the truth." Id. Videotape has its effect on
information offered to the jury by presenting a narrowed visual field, electronic and photographic
distortion, loss of detail and a selective content. Doret, Trial by Videotape — Can justice Be Seen to Be
Done?, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 228, 241-45 (1974).
257 See Winter, Probing the Probers; Does Abscam Go Too Far?, 68 A.B.A.j. 1347, 1349 (1982).
25" For example, Shuy notes that the phrase "tifi huh" can indicate "Okay, I'm waiting until
you're finished to tell you whether 1 agree" as well as "Yes." Id.
25° Id. Senator Williams alleged this as part of his defense, but the Williams court disagreed.
United States v. Williams, 529 F. Supp. at 1099.
2" See Winter,supra note 257, at 1349. Shuy gives as an example a tape which was admitted into
evidence at Conressman Murphy's trial with one sequence showing middlemen assuring FBI agents
that Murphy was "on the take" followed by another showing Murphy denying that he took any
money. Id.
281 See id.
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to read parallel mental intentions into the evidence. 262 Through its use of videotape,
therefore, the FBI presented a serious hurdle to a jury's successful application of the
subjective test of entrapment.
Proof of predisposition was also complicated by the manner in which the FBI selected
its targets. This complication resulted from the lack of any previous suspicion on the part
of the government that the target was engaged in illegal activities, 24" This is particularly
important to the notion of predispositiOn because in the Supreme Court cases holding
that the defendants were predisposed, testimony indicated that the investigating agents
had some reason to suspect that the defendants had either dealt in the past, or were
dealing presently in corn rztband. 2 " In the ABSCAM scenarios, conversely, there was a
complete lack of any previous suspicion on the part of investigating officials. 265
As a result, the government structured it.s proof of the defendants' predisposition
around the commission of the crime which was captured dramatically on videotape. The
government presented no testimony alluding to any prior illegal behavior. The lack of
such testimony was an apparent flaw in the government's case. Nonetheless, jurors
presented with mere oral testimony regarding the defendants' good character, and law
abiding propensities, might find videotape of the defendant accepting large sums of
money overwhelming proof of predisposition. In this way, the random selection process
employed by A BSCAM agents resulted in further detriment to a defense of entrapment
tinder the subject.ive test.'"
Another source of confusion in determining whether the defendants were predis-
posed emanated from the nature of the offers made to the defendants which included a
combination of legal, community-serving investments, and illegal bribes. This mixture
made it difficult to determine predisposition by confusing the defendants and the courts.
The offers confused the defendants by containing elements that. benefited both their own
interests and those of their constituencies. Councilmen Jannotti and Schwartz, for exam-
ple, argued that they were concerned with the best interests of their constituencies, 267 and
therefore their predisposition was not solely their own. In addition, the defendants may
have been confused about whether they were accepting offers which were actually
legitimate, or ones which were obviously criminal."' Furthermore, attempts to clarity
the situation through some form of 'verbal insulation" 2 " 9 served only to increase the
262 District Court Judge Bryant, in deciding the Kelly case, seems to be the only judge who, in
writing a majority opinion, took care to distinguish between Kelly's actions and his reasons for
performing those actions. United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. at 376. According to Shuy, Kelly
refused bribe money nine times, and when he finally accepted, he did so not out of acquiescence, but
out of confusion. See Winter, supra note 257, at 1349.
263 See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp ; at 371; United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. at
1226.
26' Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 485-87; United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 425-26,
436.
2" See supra notes 263.
2" No ABSCAM defendant made this allegation in terms of an entrapment defense except for
Senator Williams who maintained that government must have evidence of a defendant's predisposi-
tion in order to begin an investigation. United States v. Williams, 529 F. Supp. at 1096. The Williams
court rejected the argument. Id.
262 United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. at 1200.
262 Id.
269 The Myers defendants claimed that their actions were devoid of criminal intent because they
told their bribers that they wanted only to operate within the law. United States v. Myers, 527 F.
Supp. at 1231-32. The Myers Court found, however, that mere "verbal insulation" could not negate
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insidiousness of the events by attempting to justify morally clearly illegal acts. Because of
this combination of legal and illegal offers, actual intent-to-commit-crime was often
muddled in the minds of the defendants and predisposition became unclear.
The combined offers may also have been confusing to judges and juries. As compli-
cated as it was for the defendants to be able to distinguish between 'legitimate and
illegitimate offers, the confusion was compounded when a court was asked to view
isolated videotaped conversations and to make not only those judgments, but also to
determine the defendant's true motivations and predisposition, judgments even the
defendants must have found difficult to make. Furthermore, courts were presented with
the illegal aspect of the offer without any comparable evidence of the meetings between
targets and middlemen where clearly legitimate offers were made,'" In this way, the
mere appearance of the defendants at the videotaped meetings may have seemed to
indicate predisposition to accept illegal bribes, even though the defendant may have
believed there was no criminal intent whatsoever. Accordingly, the use of legitimate
inducements combined with illegal bribes, served to make a determination of a defen-
dant's predisposition more difficult.
The final problem in determining predisposition, and the one which has actually
attracted the most intense scrutiny, was ABSCAM's use of middlemen."' The purpose of
middlemen was to help the agents find public officials who would assist the sheik. 272
 This
tactic, however, produced several problems. First, because these middlemen were offered
a fraction of all monies eventually accepted by the politicians, the middlemen had an
incentive to approach as many officials as they could. 273
 Although the agents were
instructed to turn away any officials if there was some question about whether they would
accept an illegal offer,274
 the middlemen were never so instructed. These middlemen,
therefore, still had an incentive to make legitimate offers to the politicians, in the hopes
that the politicians later would accept an illegal offer from the sheik's representatives. 275
In this way, the middlemen may have attracted politicians who initially were not predis-
posed to accept illegal offers. Perhaps the most offensive example of this problem was
middleman Eugene Ciuzio who convinced the FBI agents that he had "virtual control"
over Congressman Kelly and could persuade him to accept a bribe. 27" None of Ciuzio's
assertions were true. 277
Additionally, because middlemen rather than undercover agents were employed to
induce the officials, there was a chance that the middlemen, who would profit from the
officials' accepting the bribe, would supplement or completely fabricate the inducements
offered by the government agents. 278
 More dangerously, because middlemen were used to
contact politicians initially, judges and jurors were presented with video evidence of the
FBI/target meetings and only oral testimony regarding what occurred during the
guilt or else it would "provide a corrupt politician easy insurance against any undercover investiga-
tion . . . [by] invoking the magic incantation '1 desire to act within the law.'" Id.
27° See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. at 367.
2" For a thorough discussion of the use of unsuspecting middlemen see Note, Entrapment
Through Unsuspecting Middlemen, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1122 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Entrapment].
272 Id. at 1136.
273 Id. at 1135.
27' United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. at 374.
27' Entrapment, supra note 271, at 1135.
"g United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. at 367.
277
278 See Entrapment, supra note 271, at 1135.
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middlemen target meetings. 279 It is precisely this type of evidence, however, which could
play a crucial role in determining whether the defendants were predisposed. Thus, the
lack of any reliable evidence of these early meetings seems to constitute a potential
prejudice which even the most legitimate entrapment defense could not withstand.
In the ABSCAM scenarios, the predisposition of the defendants was difficult to
ascertain. The videotape evidence of the physical act of the commission of the crime was
one source of this difficulty. In addition, the absence of any reason to suspect the
defendants of prior illegal activity, as well as the minimal or confusing testimony of the
middlemen made the determination of predisposition difficult. Videotape evidence of the
physical commission of' a crime is not a reliable indicator of predisposition, yet the
dramatic nature of such evidence may lead a jury to regard it as conclusive proof of
predisposition. When the subjective test for entrapment is used, the effect of the video-
taped evidence on the factfinder may make proving entrapment difficult.
As a result of the failure of the subjective theory, a variety of scholars, 2 s° legis-
lators,28 ' courts, 2 " 2 and Supreme Court. justices,283 have advocated the alternative, objec-
tive theory. Many of the. arguments made in support of the objective test are actually
criticisms of the subjective test. 284 It is argued that predisposition is a test for which there
are no workable, non-prejudicial stanclards; 2 " that predisposition allows for the admis-
sion of evidence of the accused's character, reputation and past criminal concluct; 2 " that
it is particularly unfair to the second offender who must deny predisposition in spite of
his past act; 287 and that it may even involve a denial of equal protection of the law. 2"
Furthermore, it has been alleged that because the subjective test avoids any consideration
of police conduct, it ignores a basic function of the entrapment defense: to deter improp-
er police conduct. 2 " 9 Control over police tactics is a responsibility to which a defendant's
predisposition is completely irrevelant. Along with the need for deterrence, which has
been a vital force behind the push for a uniform entrapment test, 29° an important
potential benefit of the objective standard is the protection of the "purity of the judicial
systern." 291 This protection, advocated by Justice Roberts in Sorrells 2 " and by Justice
"9 See, e.g., United States v. Kelly. 539 F. Supp. at 367-70.
290 See supra note 39.
2" See supra note 40.
282 See id.
183
	
supra note 38.
2" See, e.g., Predisposition, supra note 39, at 550-57; Note, Entrapment: Time to Take an Objective
Look, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 324, 335-39 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Objective].
295
	
Objective, supra note 284, at 336.
299
	
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 443 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Predisposition, supra note 39,
at 552; Objective, supra note 284, at 336.
291 See Predisposition, .supra note 39, at 552 n.39; Note, Criminal Procedure — The Entrapment
Defense — A Reexamination, 25 MERCER L. REV. 957, 960 (1974).
2" See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 383 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Objective, supra
note 284, at 336. Given two defendants in identical situations a court or jury may find one defendant
was entrapped because he has no prior criminal record, but find that the other defendant was not
entrapped because of a prior record of totally unrelated criminal activity. Id.
299 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 382-83 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
29° The American Law Institute adopted a form of this test in the Model Penal Code 2.13
(Official Draft 1962) and the National Commission on Reform of Federal Laws proposed a similar
test in FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL LAWS, A PROPOSED
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 702(2) (1971).
"I See Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 224 (1976).
292 287 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, J., concurring).
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Frankfurter in Sherman, 293
 insures the public that its law enforcement officials and its
courts will continue to "formulate and apply 'proper standards for the enforcement of the
federal criminal law in the federal courts,' "29' a protection not offered under the
predisposition test. Despite this impressive undercurrent. favoring the objective test of
entrapment, and despite the particular ABSCAM-related problems existing because of
the use of the subjective test, clear federal precedent still requires that the subjective test
be applied.' 95
Considering the benefits which the objective theory seems to avail to defendants in
general, it is necessary to examine the advantages which the theory would afford the
ABSCAM defendant. With the objective theory, a reviewing court's emphasis shifts from
the conduct of the defendant to that. of the government. 29" As such, many of the problems
the ABSCAM defendants faced under the subjective test become less severe. Because
"outrageous government conduct," unlike predisposition, does not involve intent, or the
defendant's state of mind, physical evidence such as videotape becomes much more
reliable. Similarly, because the objective test relies on a reasonable man standard, as
opposed to the defendant's predisposition, the courts are not confronted by the problems
that were encountered regarding character testimony, evidence of past crimes, and the
possibility of confusion on the part of the defendant. 297
 Rather, judges and jurors need
only determine how the reasonable man would react to the actual, physical conduct which
the government clearly displayed on the videotape, a decision whose resolution will not.
depend on prior suspicion, combination offers or irresponsible middlemen. Therefore,
not only are the problems peculiar to videotaped evidence itself resolved, but the em-
ployment. of such evidence reaches the high levels of reliability for which it was designed.
The methods of proof" would no longer involve subjective, state of mind, character
evaluations, but rather, objective, physical, conduct evaluations. The videotape evidence
so important to the ABSCAM investigation seems, therefore, to be a perfect complement
to the objective test of entrapment. Unfortunately, as long as the subjective theory
remains ruling precedent, the objective I heory will he beyond the reach of entrapment
defendants.
B. Due Process
Although the objective theory of entrapment proved to be of no avail to ABSCAM
defendants, courts did examine whether government conduct may have been outrageous
through the defendants' due process argument. Like the defense of objective entrap-
ment, this defense focused not on the defedant's state of mind, but on the actions of the
policing agents. These actions could conceivably become so outrageous that they would he
the sole cause of the crime, thus overstepping permissible police conduct and denying the
defendant's due process rights. Several judges have warned of the possibility that the due
process defense could become merely a reworking of the unacceptable objective
292 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
294 Id. (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1942)).
292 The Myers court determined that adoption of the objective test was only within the power of
the Supreme Court or Congress. United States v. Myers, 527 F. Stipp. at 1225.
2 " Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 386 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
297 For a discussion of the problems associated with the subjective test, see supra notes 253.79 and
accompanying text.
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theory.298 Although this criticism is warranted in that both theories seek to protect
individuals against outrageous government conduct, 2 °° due process has a constitutional
basis whereas the objective theory does not.
The test for due process has never been clearly articulated. The Supreme Court has
never found that government conduct was outrageous in the context of a criminal
investigation. In considering whether the drug-manufacturing defendant in Russell had
been entrapped, however, the Court did make reference to Rochin v. California, 3 °° in
which the police pumped a suspect's stomach against his will because they believed that he
had swallowed two capsules of narcotics. 3 ° 1 Finding that t he police conduct "shocked the
conscience,"302 the Court held that these acts violated the defendant's due process
rights. 3 °3 Only two ABSCAM courts, in the Alexandro and Kelly circuit court of appeals,
considered this precedent, 304 and both courts clearly distinguished the police conduct in
Rochin from the actions of the ABSCAM agents, noting that the ABSCAM investigation
included no bodily invasion, coercion or physical or psychological pain. 305
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United Stales v. Twigg, 306
is the only circuit court which has acquitted a defendant based on a "demonstrable level of
outrageousness." 307 The Twigg court, however, failed to articulate a clear standard for
determining outrageousness other than conduct which violates "fundamental fair-
ness."308 Among the ABSCAM courts, the district court in Kelly was the only court which
attempted to define what constitutes outrageous government conduct. The Kelly district
court stated that the situation contrived by the government should be one which the
individual is likely to encounter in the ordinary course. 308 The court used this standard to
find that the government conduct was outrageous due to the agents' persistence in
offering the bribe after Kelly's initial refusal.'" The court reasoned that it was not
realistic for a real person to persist in offering bribes to a politician for fear of being
revealed to the police. 3 " Congressman Thompson presented the Myers court with a
similar argument. 312 In Myers, however, the court reached a contrary result,213 reasoning
that there was no constitutional issue raised by more than one bribe offer, and that
Thompson's rights were in no way infringed by such additional offers. 314
2a8
	 States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 608; United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d at 383 (Adams,
J., dissenting).
2" United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32, 441 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. at 383-84 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
"° 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
30 ' Id. at 166.
3°2
	 at 172.
303 Id. at 174.
3° 4 United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d at 40; United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d at 1476.
"3 675 F.2d at 40, 707 F.2d at 1476.
306 588 F.2d 373 (1978).
367
	 at 380.
3 ° 8
 id. at 381 (quoting Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 494-95 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring)).
3" United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. at 374.
316 Id. at 374 - 76.
3" Id. at 374. The Kelly circuit court, in refuting the lower court standard, pointed out that
parties to a real bribe transaction could easily adjust to a "one - refusal" rule: the real bribe - taker
would always refuse the initial offer. 707 F.2d at 1475 n.9.
312 United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. at 1237.
"3 Id.
314 Id.
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The lower Kelly court also attempted to expose such improprieties as ABSCAM's
ability to punish . both criminally and politically.'3 i ' In the post-Watergate American
society, even if a politician were to be fully acquitted, his career undoubtedly would be
ruined, if not because his constituency watched him accepting a bribe on the evening
news, certainly because he had spent considerable amounts of time, money and energy on
a long and painful tria1.316 But although Congressmen do have certain, ostensibly job-
related, privileges' that other citizens do not, they are by no means citizens above
suspicion. It is highly unlikely that any court would seriously consider the notion that the
Constitution presents Congressmen with any special due process rights, either to be a
Congressman, to be immune from investigation or to be free from the political ramifica-
tions of such investigations.
In summary, the ABSCAM courts almost universally held that the ABSCAM investi-
gations did not violate the due process rights of the defendants. Although this finding
may be due more to the lack of precedent, the vagueness of due process standards and the
similarity of the due process defense to objective entrapment than to the actual degree of
the government conduct, the mandate of a majority of the courts is clear. The conduct of
the ABSCAM agents did not reach a level so outrageous that it should require dismissal of
the case. Despite this mandate, several judges, and even the federal government have
spoken out against the manner in which the FBI conducted the ABSCAM investiga-
lion . 3 " These statements, as well as those of Congress and the United Slates Attorney
General's office will be examined in the final section of This article. That section will also
reevaluate ABSCAM and make suggestions regarding the Si ructure, purpose and merits
of similar investigations for the future.
IV, ABSCAM's FuTuRr, IMPLICATIONS
The purpose of the ABSCAM investigation was the identification and eradication of
corruption in government. It was successful in that almost a dozen men in important
government positions were convicted of several bribery-related crimes. ABSCA M's suc-
cess, however, raised several important questions regarding the limits to which such
investigations may go to achieve these goals. This final section of this note will deal with
these questions and some of the answers which have been suggested.
3 ' 3 United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. at 378 n.58.
316 None of the United States Representatives who were defendants in ABSCAM trials were
able to keep their elected offices. Michael Myers was formally expelled from the House of Represen-
tatives and lost a subsequent bid for the reelection in 1980. M. BARONE & G. LIJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC
OF AMERICAN Pourics 1982, at 941-42. Raymond Lederer was reelected in 1980 but resigned in May
of 1981 following a move to oust him from the House. Id. at 944 - 45. John Murphy, Frank Thompson
and John Jenrette each won their respective 1980 Democratic primaries but lost in the general
elections. Id. at 765, 686, 1015. Richard Kelly, the only Republican Congressman to have been
indicted, came in third in his party's 1980 primary. Id. at 223.
317
 One such privilege is provided by the Speech and Debate Clause which Kelly attempted to
employ to suppress extensive amounts of evidence, but to no avail. In re Possible Violations of 18
U.S.C. §§ 201, 371, 491 F. Supp. 211, 213-15 (1980).
3 " The Kelly district court went so far as to say that the whole scenario had "an odor to it that is
absolutely repulsive ... it stinks." United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. at 373 n.45. The Kelly circuit
court, while reinstating the guilty verdicts, shared the district court's "grave concern that the Abscam
drama ... unfolded as 'an unwholesome spectacle.' " 707 F.2d at 1477. Dissenting Circuit Judge
Aldisert, inJannotti wrote that the operation "emanates a fetid odor whose putruscence threatens to
spoil basic concepts of fairness and justice that I hold dear." United Stales v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 613
(Aldisert, J., dissenting).
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Several of the opinion-writing ABSCAM judges voiced their disapproval of certain
undercover investigatory techniques.'" The Alexandra court, speaking in general terms,
maintained that at the heart of our democracy rests the principle that all individuals are
protected from governmental overreaching and that "the end cannot justify the
means."3" The Kelly district court, more specific in its protest, wrote, "even if a victim
successfully invoked the [due process and entrapment] defenses ... this would be of little
solace to him, for he nevertheless has been destroyed as a voice in public affairs." 3 "
The concern expressed by these courts is related to Senator Williams' defense
regarding the anti-Kennedy conspiracy. 322 Although the Williams court held that the
accusations had no basis in reality, 323 the possibility exists that an ABSCAM-type investi-
gation could be focused upon a particular individual for reasons unrelated to the detec-
tion of criminal activity."' Thus, the ramifications relate not only to personal vendettas
but even to the balance of power between the branches of the federal government. 325
In light of these concerns, the United States Attorney General's office has promul-
gated specific guidelines for FBI undercover operations. 325 Several of these guidelines
specifically address some of the problems inherent in the ABSCAM investigation. 327 One
3" United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Stipp. at 373; United Stales v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. at 1204.
ago
	
States v. Alexandra 675 F.2d at 43. The court added confidently, however, that "we
find it clear in this case that the means fully vindicate the end . . ." Id.
"' United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Stipp. at 378 n.58.
332
	 supra note 174 and accompanying text.
323 United States v. Williams, 529 F. Supp. at 1101.
924 United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. at 377-78 n.58.
325
	
FBI, as an arm of the executive branch, could potentially rout the legislative branch by
offering unwary Congressmen huge bribes in large numbers. Even if they did not accept, the
resulting scandal would undoubtedly rock the government.
636 ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES ON FBI UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS (Dec. 31, 1980) [here-
inafter cited as GUIDELINES].
3 " Gut DELINES, Sllpra note 326, at 13-14. Paragraph J. "Authorization of the creation of oppor-
tunities for Illegal Activities," provides in full:
(1) Entrapment. should he scrupulously avoided. Ent rapment is the inducement or
encouragement of an individual to engage in illegal activity in which he would other-
wise not be disposed to engage.
(2) In addition to complying with any legal requirements, before approving an
undercover operation involving an invitation to engage in illegal activity, the approving
authority should be satisfied that
(a) There is a reasonable indication, based on information developed through
(b) There is a reasonable indication that the undercover operation will reveal illegal
activities; and
(c) The nature of any inducement is not unjustifiable in view of the character of the
illegal transaction in which the individual is invited to engage.
(3) Under the law of entrapment, inducements may be offered to an individual
even though there is no reasonable indication that that particular individual had
engaged, or is engaging, in the illegal activity that is properly under investigation.
Nonetheless, no such undercover operation shall be approved without the specific
written authorization of the Director, unless the Undercover Operations Review Com-
mittee determines, ... insofar as practicable, that either
(a) There is a reasonable indication, based on information developed through
informants or other means, that the subject is engaging, has engaged, or is likely to
engage in illegal activity of a similar type; or
(b) The opportunity for illegal activity has been structured so that there is reason
for believing that persons drawn to the opportunity, or brought ID it, are predisposed to
engage in the contemplated illegal activity.
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guideline focuses on the requirement of prior suspicion of targets'"" The Guidelines
require that agents make no offers or inducements without specific written authorization
from the Director of the FBI or unless there is reasonable indication that the subject has
engaged in, is engaged in, or is likely to engage in_slich a crime_or that the subject is clearly
predisposed to such crimes as can be evidenced by the structure of the inducement." 28
The Guidelines also require that the corrupt nature of the inducement be made clear and
specific,33 ° thus alleviating the problem presented by middlemen who misrepresent the
inducement. In addition, the Guidelines require that the actual decision to offer an illegal
inducement should be made solely on law enforcement considerations. 33 ' Finally, the
Guidelines address the possible confusion which may result in combination legal/illegal
offers. The Guidelines require that the corrupt nature of the activity must be reasonably
clear, that there be a reasonable indication that a corresponding illegal activity will follow
on the part of the subject and that the inducement itself must not be unjustifiably
attractive in view of the overall illegal transaction. 332
 The Justice Department hoped that
by establishing standards "significantly more restrictive" than the standards of entrap-
ment or due process enforced by the courts, 3
 these Guidelines would reduce the
likelihood that FBI investigations would entrap their targets.
Congress has also taken a close look at the ABSCAM investigation and FB1 investiga:
Lions in general."'" The Senate Select Committee on Justice Department Activities has
addressed itself to a number of the problems of the ABSCAM investigation, paying
particular attention to the reliability of middlemen. 335 The committee has considered
recommending that middleman reliability be tested under the same light that an infor-
mant's word is considered in requesting a search warrant. 336 In addition, the committee
may rectify the problems relating to a lack of prior suspicion by requiring that the FBI
obtain a court order based on "reasonable suspicion" before investigating any individ-
ual. 3 " Other recommendations being considered by Congress include the requirement of
a warrant for electronic monitoring, amendment of the federal bribery law to clarify
entrapment standards, modification of FBI and justice Department internal controls, and
a requirement that all undercover operation inducements be modeled after real world
temptations. 33 " Should any or all of these recommendations come to fruition, it is evident
(4) In any undercover operation, the decision to offer an inducement to an
individual, or to otherwise invite an individual to engage in illegal activity, shall be
based solely on law enforcemeni considerations.
Id at 14.
3" Id. Paragraph J(3)(b) at 14.
329 Id. Paragraphs J(3)(a) and (b) at 14.
"° Id. Paragraph J(2)(a) at 14.
331 Id. Paragraph J(4) at 14.
332 Id. Paragraphs J(2)(a), (b) and (c) at 14.
333 N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1981, at A16, col. 1.
334 See Winter, supra note 257, at 1347.
333 See id. at 1348. (Although this article reports that a committee report was due out on
Decembei- 15, 1982, as of the writing of this draft, the report had yet to be made available.)
336 See id. The United States Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas established a two-pronged test
for determining the availability of a warrant based on an informant's information. Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964). The Court required that the affidavit supporting the warrant must lead a
neutral magistrate to believe, first, that the informant is generally credible, and second, that in this
particular case, the informant's information is accurate. Id.
337
 Winter, supra note 257, at 1350.
338 Id.
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that they could only help resolve the various obstacles encountered by the ABSCAM
defendants, especially in terms of protecting those for whom no prior suspicion exists.
ABSCAM did have at least one scenario, the Alexandra case, involving the corrupt
Immigration Service official, which proved to be an efficient and responsible attempt to
achieve ABSCAM's purposes without adversely affecting the defendant's personal
rights.339 Although its design was based on the simple asylum scenario, the investigation
was conducted so as to involve certain elements missing from the other scenarios. These
elements should set. the very standards by winch all future bribery scams should be
conducted.
One element which distinguished the Alexandra scenario from other ABSCAM
scenarios is that Alexandro was presented to the agents through only one middleman; a
man who bad worked with Alexanclro in the past and could attest to some form of clear,
criminal disposition. 34 ° Such familiarity between middlemen and targets is essential for
several reasons: First, it minimizes the lack of control which the agents can have over a
middleman, as exhibited by the diluted link between the agents and Congressman Kelly in
his case. 34 ' Second, it allows for more accurate testimony regarding the target's predisposi-
tion, thus supplementing the physical, video evidence with evidence of state of mind.
Third, it• lessens the potential that the offer itself will be misrepresented.
A second element which distinguished the Alexandra scenario is that Alexandro was
never presented with anything but an illegal offer. 3 ' 2 In this way, the government lessens
the likelihood that the offer will be misunderstood, and that the target himself will be able
to console his conscience with the notion that illegality is only a small means to achieve a
greater, completely legal, end. Of course, using only illegal offers creates a greater risk
that the middleman may be turned in to the authorities by the target, but this also insures
that the middleman will seek Out only those targets who he really believes will be open to
his proposals, and hence, be predisposed.
A third element which distinguishes the Alexandra scenario is that Alexandro was
required to take an active role in planning the illegal activity. 343 Unlikely many of the
other ABSCAM defendants, Alexandro actually volunteered not only a list of the services
he could provide the sheik, but also a - price fOr them."' This conduct demonstrated a
clear understanding of the criminal nature of the deal, and an active and enthusiastic
desire to participate in commission of a crime. 3 a 5 Thus, proof of predisposition was based
not on the commission of the act, but. on a premeditated desire to proceed with the act .3"
The final element which set the Alexandra scenario apart from the others is that.
Alexandro was not offered any money until after he had displayed his active interest in
proceeding with the criminal aCliVil y.34' With this method of bribery, there is little chance
that the defendant is trying to "swindle the sheik" by not keeping his promise, 346 and it
336 United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d at '37. See supra notes 176 - 88 and accompanying text.
"" See United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d at 36-37.
" 1. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
"2 See United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2c1 at 37.
"3 Id. at 37-38.
" 4 Id.
"" See United States v. jannotti, 501 F. Supp. at 1200.
396 Predisposition was not difficult for the court to infer in Alexandra, especially considering
the defendant's recorded comment about the success of the transactions, which he "guaranteed
... because rye done it before." United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d at 38-39.
347 See Id.
"" Congressman Myers made this claim in United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. at 1212 - 13.
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certainly dismisses the possibility that the target was investigating his i n vestigators . 349 The
mere passage of time seems to work in favor of justice. Each of the other ABSCAM
defendants was faced with virtual ultimatums to either rake the money now or forego it.
Perhaps if they had been given more time to consider the offer, or better yet, if they had
been given the opportunity to show their sincerity by actually introducing the immigra-
tion bill, their clear intent and predisposition would then be irrefutable.
Thus, the strenghts of the Alexandra scenario illuminated A BSCAM's most grievous
weakness. To overcome claims of entrapment, the government must. establish that the
defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. Yet many of the techniques used in
ABSCAM suggest that the government, rather than the defendants, may have supplied
the willingness to commit the crime. Confidence man Weinberg, in testimony taken from
the Schwartz trial, boasted, "we had a honey pot and the flies came."' Although this is
undoubtedly the way ABSCAM was designed to operate, there is considerable doubt
about its basis in fact."' This, therefore, is the crux of the ABSCAM entrapment
dilemma: Entrapment occurs when the government manufactures a crime and the man-
ner through which it disproves this allegation is the proof of predisposition. 352 In
ABSCAM, the government showed that it had the ability to ferret out corruption. As the
jannotti dissent put it, "if sufficiently attractive monetary and civic inducements are
dangled, there are fish who will bite." 353
 Unfortunately, as the dissent continued, this
"does not demonstrate that the fish were predisposed to take the bait." 3 "
CONCLUSION
ABSCAM was not the FBI's first corruption investigation."'" Nor is it likely to he its
last. It is therefore necessary that the FBI and the courts carefully reevaluate ABSCAM
and the problems that it presented.
The ABSCAM investigation resulted in the indictment of over a dozen politically-
influential individuals, all of whom have been found guilty. 356
 Each of these defendants
pleaded an entrapment or due process defense. 357
 It has been submitted, however, that
the subjective theory of entrapment was unavailable to the ABSCAM defendants because
of the selection procedure employed by the FBI.'" This procedure effectively limited the
"" This was alleged in both United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. at 377 n.58, and United States v.
Alexandro, 675 F.2d at 38-39.
33°
 United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. at 1226.
3" Judge Aldisert of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals contended, "The party was by
invitation only; when the guests came to the pot it was not necessary for them to ask for a sample;
rather, their mouths were opened for them and the honey poured down their gullets." United States
v. Jannoni, 673 F.2d at 613 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
a" United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 429.
3b3
 United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 621 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
3" Id.
"' Two simultaneous investigations were also held during ABSCAM. One, called PENDORF,
involved, among other things, conspiracy to bribe a United States Senator. See United States v.
Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. 345, 356
- 58 (N.D. III. 1982), aft 690 Eat 1217 (1982). The other, called
BRILAB, involved labor organization corruption. See United States v. Marcello, 508 F. Stipp, 586,
588-89 (E.D. La. 1981), reheard at 537 F. Supp. 1364 (E.D. La. 1982).
"6
 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
357
	 supra notes 20-21 and -
 accompanying text.
15" See supra notes 263-66 and accompanying text.
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government's proof of disposition to the "on the spot" video coverage, thus considerably
devaluing any standard oral testimony which could dissuade a finding of predisposi-
tion.559 As long as the subjective theory is the test to be applied, random selection
investigations like ABSCAM will be no-win situations for the defendants.
It has also been submitted that clue to federal precedents rejecting the objective
theory of entrapment, it also presents little chance of acquittal.u° This unavailability of the
objective theory goes hand-in-hand with the problems courts faced in deciding claims that
government conduct was sufficiently outrageous to violate the defendants' due process
rights."' Many courts simply refused to consider such claims, treating them as if they
were merely the objective theory of entrapment in another form. 362 More importantly,
the courts which did decide to consider these claims found no suitable tests, standards or
precedents to be applied in bribery-type cases. 383 Defendants who alleged these defenses,
therefore, fared poorly.
Structurally, ABSCAM was flawed. As long as modern entrapment and due process
law remain as they are, random selection bribery investigations which employ unsuspect-
ing middlemen and videotape evidence will remain fundamentally inequitable. Although
few courts could specifically connect these inequities with a particular due process or
entrapment claim, most courts strongly urged that the FBI and all law enforcement
agencies must structure future investigations differently."' Whether this will be done
because of Attorney General Guidelines, Congressional recommendations or some other
bureaucratic or legislative mandates has yet to be decided, but it seems evident from the
suggestions made so far t hat the goal of the restructuring must be a greater respect for
the rights of the individual targets of the investigations. Policing agencies and reviewing
courts must consider a careful balance; they must weigh the need to expose political
corruption against the costs such exposure will levy against innocent parties. In doing so,
they must always bear in mind Justice Holmes' observation that "it is a less evil that some
criminals should escape than that the Government should play an ignoble part." 355
PATRIC M. VERRONE
35"
	 supra notes 253-62 and accompanying text.
mil See supra notes 280-97 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 298 -317 and accompanying text.
sin See supra notes 298-99 and accompanying text.
See supra. notes 300-14 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 319-25 and accompanying text.
3 ° 5
 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
